Out of the margins

Guest Editor
Elizabeth Valentine
introduces the special issue of the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section.

HISTORY and philosophy are frequently marginalized and treated as second class citizens in comparison with other subject areas within psychology. Indices of the differential treatment afforded them can be seen by examining criteria of respectability for recognized teaching and research areas, such as their place in the curriculum and the existence of higher degrees, specialist posts, learned societies, opportunities for research funding and publication outlets. Adrian Brock, in his paper, contrasts the situation in the UK — in most cases unfavourably — with the United States on the one hand and Europe on the other.

Reasons for this marginalization have been discussed by Richards (1994). They include extrinsic factors such as the current emphasis on short-term material gain and easy assimilation. Intrinsic factors are also present, notably the positivist inheritance: in the clamour to become a respectable science, psychology developed an abhorrence of anything philosophical. The purpose of courses in the history of psychology was typically to celebrate the progression towards an ideal current state. However, this 'Whiggist' position now finds few supporters. In recent years radical changes have taken place as the result of work by scholars such as Danziger (1990) and Leary (1990), which calls for a reassessment of the situation. Over the last 20 years there has been a burgeoning of activity, with the formation of archives, journals and learned societies, as Adrian Brock documents.

Awareness

An obvious reason for becoming cognisant with the history of the subject is to be aware of what has already been done. In this way, it is argued, we shall be prevented from reinventing the wheel, enabled to learn from our mistakes and provided with a source of new ideas. This is particularly necessary in fashion-prone, paradigm-driven psychology, where problems are frequently shelved rather than solved. I agree with Hayes (1994) that there is a real danger that well-established facts concerning basic processes will be forgotten. A philosophical approach is necessary due to the complexity, fragmentation and social embeddedness of psychology. Psychology par excellence does not occur in a social or historical vacuum. Likely resulting benefits are the provision of perspective — of an intellectual map where established theoretical frameworks are often lacking — and the integration and synthesis of diverse elements. Hidden assumptions need to be revealed and the development of critical awareness and reflection encouraged.

The conclusion to the debate about the role of history and philosophy in psychology hinges on how its relation to established sciences is viewed. The teaching of courses in the history and philosophy of the subject was perhaps first motivated by a concern to demonstrate that psychology was a science like any other. Ironically, the achievement of this goal led to its demise, since the teaching of history is largely irrelevant to accepted sciences (Wetherick, 1994).

Currently, the role of history and philosophy is seen as serving a rather different function. Most recent scholarship is driven by the conviction that psychology is in many ways very different from other sciences (and may not be a science at all), and that much of psychology is socially and historically constructed. The purpose of such study then becomes an appreciation of the mutual interaction between psychology and society, especially crucial at this time

of increased demand for relevance and applicability of findings, together with rapid change and mounting social pressures on public life in general.

The articles in this special issue have been chosen to examine different aspects of these subject areas, both theoretical and practical. Adrian Brock tackles the role of history and philosophy in the undergraduate curriculum and argues that 'if history and philosophy of psychology is to make a serious contribution to the intellectual life of psychology, then it must have a pedagogy which is informed by research'. Paul Stenner and Steven Brown take up this theme, with an article boldly entitled: 'Implications for research'. They argue for the centrality of historical and philosophical considerations within the broad spectrum of existing psychological research.

The following two papers deal with practical issues. Clare Crellin considers the contribution of a study of philosophy to the practice of psychotherapy, in particular reflecting on the nature of psychotherapy, the definition and status of a symptom, the role of memory in psychotherapy and ways of thinking about the ethical relationship with the client. Finally, Graham Richards focuses on a specific social issue, that of race and racism. He seeks to demonstrate that detailed historical research deepens our insights not only into this topic in partic-

ular but into the discipline itself — by making us more aware of the psychological dynamics of our society, and giving us a sense of 'the nature and pace of Psychological *and* psychological changes over time'. In this way, 'the history of Psychology ceases to be a mere antiquarian exercise but becomes an essential part of the task of understanding that Protean phenomenon, psychology — the ever changing subject matter of our discipline'.

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Pedagogy and research

Adrian Brock
*examines the
changing role of
history and
philosophy within the
psychology
curriculum.*

TEXTBOOKS on the history of psychology are almost as old as the discipline itself. Ebbinghaus's famous statement that psychology has a short history and a long past did not prevent writers such as Dessoir (1912), Rand (1912), Brett (1912-21), Baldwin (1913) and Klemm (1914) from publishing works on what they understood to be the history of psychology.

By the time that Boring's classic text, *A History of Experimental Psychology* (1929), appeared, there was already a substantial literature on the history of psychology. This literature was mainly pedagogical in its aims and was used to supplement courses in this subject. Boring's own book was based on lecture notes which he had prepared for a course at Clark University in 1921 and subsequently refined at Harvard University.

This course was, in turn, based on a course which Boring's mentor, E.B. Titchener, had taught at Cornell University (Boring, 1961). Although Boring's text came to be regarded as the authoritative work on the history of psychology, it was only one of several that appeared around this time. Murphy's *A Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* and Pillsbury's *The History of Psychology* were also published in 1929. The appearance of three textbooks on the history of psychology in the same year suggests that this subject was already being taught widely in American colleges and universities.

Variety

Philosophy of psychology was never as well established in the psychology curriculum as history of psychology. The traditional animosity of psychologists towards philosophy, as expressed in the taboo on armchair speculation, was largely responsible for this situation. There was a need, however, to explain the bewildering variety of approaches to psychology which had emerged in the first two decades of the 20th century. Works such as Woodworth's *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (1933) and Heidbreder's *Seven Psychologies* (1933) served to meet this need. These works were typically used in courses titled 'Systems and Theories of Psychology'

(e.g. Chaplin & Krawiec, 1960). Often, they would be merged with history of psychology into a course titled 'History and Systems of Psychology' (e.g. Riedel, 1971). This term continues to be widely used in the United States and many modern textbooks on the history of psychology are centred on the notion of 'systems'.

When psychology began to experience a period of sustained growth after the Second World War, 'history and systems of psychology' was firmly entrenched as a part of the psychology curriculum and new editions of the texts by Woodworth (1948), Murphy (1949) and Boring (1950) were published to meet the demand. The subject area is still an important part of the undergraduate curriculum in the US where it is often a compulsory or 'core' course (Ash, 1983). This is also true of postgraduate degrees. The American Psychological Association requires that all of its approved training programmes for applied practitioners contain at least one course on 'history and systems of psychology' (APA, 1995, p.7).

No systematic survey exists of how widely taught history and philosophy of psychology is in British colleges and universities. The British Psychological Society does not require that this be taught at any stage of its approved undergraduate or postgraduate degrees. In theory, one could qualify as a psychologist without knowing anything at all about this subject[1]. In practice, a course is typically offered at some stage of the undergraduate degree, usually as part of a general introduction to psychology during the first year.

What is particularly interesting about this situation is that 'history and systems of psychology' became an area of pedagogy without becoming an area of research. The psychologists who teach these courses may or may not be interested in the subject, but it is rarely their main area of specialist training and/or research. In this respect, it differs from other areas of psychology and is more of a 'service' course like research design and statistics. One often sees advertisements in *The APA Monitor* for a cognitive or a social psychologist who can also teach either 'history and systems of psychology' or 'quantitative methods'.

These comments apply equally to the authors of the textbooks which are used to support the courses. Given that history and philosophy of psychology has not traditionally been regarded as an area of research, one could legitimately ask where the authors of these textbooks get their information from. The usual pattern is for psychologists to teach a 'history and systems' course at some stage in their careers and then to publish lecture notes which have been taken from a sample of the pedagogical literature.

Developments have been taking place since the 1960s which have begun to render this situation obsolete. In the 1960s, Division 24 (Theoretical/Philosophical Psychology) and Division 26 (History of Psychology) were established within the American Psychological Association. The establishment of these two Divisions was only part of a wider series of developments that included the establishment of the Archives for the History of American Psychology, the Cheiron Society (Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences) and the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*. The archives served to provide material for original research, and the professional organizations and the journal provided an outlet for this research.

This trend quickly spread to other parts of the world. Many national organizations of psychologists, including The British Psychological Society, now have divisions, sections or special interest groups devoted to history and/or philosophy of psychology. New international organizations, such as the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences (ESHHS) and the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (ISTP), have been established. Journals have proliferated at a remarkable rate. In addition to the *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, there is now the *Journal of Theoretical/Philosophical Psychology*, *History of the Human Sciences*, *Philosophical Psychology* and *Theory and Psychology*; as well as bilingual journals like *Psychologie und Geschichte*, *Revista de Historia de la Psicología* and *Storia della Psicologia*. New journals are continuing to appear. The American Psychological Association began publishing a new journal, *History of Psychology*, at the start of this year.

History and theory/philosophy of psychology is now an active area of research. It is unlikely that it would have grown so quickly if it did not have a pedagogical basis from which to work. Many researchers became interested in the field after taking a 'History and Systems' course as undergraduates. What kind of influence has this new situation had on the pedagogical basis from which it all began?

Research area

The first signs that the field had become an active area of research came when a handful of psychologists started to criticize the accepted authorities on the history of psychology, such as Boring's *A History of Experimental Psychology* or Gordon Allport's essay in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (e.g. Samelson, 1974; Danziger, 1979; Harris, 1979). In an interview which I conducted with Kurt Danziger in 1994 (Brock, 1995), he compared his situation with that of 'a subject in an Asch conformity experiment':

> I decided to make use of the opportunity presented by a sabbatical in 1973–74 to really acquaint myself with the primary literature in the history of psychology — in particular, the German literature — Wundt, Fechner, Helmholtz and many less prominent characters. My experience at that point was a bit like a subject in an Asch conformity experiment because what I was reading didn't seem to jibe with what I had previously read in secondary sources like Boring and some others. Of course, I had simply trusted these sources previously. (p.357)

Trusting secondary sources had been the root of the problem. Boring (1929/1950) had based his work on the pedagogical literature which existed up to that time and the anecdotal accounts of figures such as Hall (1912) and Titchener (1920). Subsequent writers had based their accounts on the work of Boring and his contemporaries. It was like the old party game where a message is passed along a line of people and becomes increasingly distorted along the way.

Perhaps the best known example of this process concerns the work of Wilhelm Wundt. In response to the criticisms of Danziger and others, many textbook writers completely revised their accounts of Wundt. Schultz and Schultz (1987) wrote:

> Thus, generations of students have been offered a portrait of Wundtian psychology that may be more myth than fact, more legend than truth. For 100 years after the event, texts in the history of psychology, including the previous editions of this one, and teachers of the history course, may have been compounding and reinforcing the error under the imprimatur of their alleged expertise. (p.238)

The response has generally been to treat such cases as the exception rather than the rule. In a more detailed analysis of textbooks, I have argued that they are the rule rather than the exception (Brock, 1993). This situation exists because history and systems of psychology has traditionally been regarded as an area of pedagogy but not as an area of research.

Since the 1970s, specialists have gen-erally ceased their criticism of 'textbook' or 'preface' history and prefer to get on with the business of serious research. Many now accept that myths and legends have a life of their own. A small minority have been enticed by the huge market in 'history and systems' textbooks and have begun to produce more scholarly texts. While these works are undoubtedly a vast improvement on most of the pedagogical literature that exists, they are still constrained by the limitations of the genre, which essentially involves compacting the entire history of psychology into the pages of one book. A basic canon of historical/philosophical research is that one should always go back to the original sources and no human being can claim to be familiar with the work of every writer on psychology from the Ancient Greeks, or even from the 17th century, to the present. Specialists who write in this genre are also forced to rely on secondary sources, and reliable material on many of these writers does not exist. There has simply not been enough research to provide anything like a comprehensive account of the history of psychology.

Meanwhile, the authors of the most popular textbooks are not specialists and continue to derive their accounts from the pedagogical literature. The psychologists who teach these courses are rarely specialists either and simply trust the information that they find in these texts. A major problem here is that, while history and philosophy of psychology has been growing as an area of research, the psychologists who specialize in this field are only a tiny percentage of the profession as a whole; whereas the 'history and systems' course has been institutionalized throughout the entire discipline.

Hobby

If history and philosophy of psychology is to make a serious contribution to the intellectual life of psychology, then it must have a pedagogy that is informed by research. In this respect, it does not differ from any other area of psychology. A second aspect to the dialectic which is often overlooked is that the research must be informed by pedagogy. A small number of researchers in the field come from a background in history and philosophy of science, but these are few and far between. Departments of history and philosophy of science continue to be heavily focused on the natural sciences (Danziger, 1994). The vast majority of researchers are professional psychologists, but very few of them have any formal training in history and/or philosophy. The usual pattern is for psychologists to qualify in a more traditional area of psychology and then to turn to history and philosophy of psychology as a part-time hobby or as a second career. Some have acquired the

skills and background knowledge that are needed to make this switch, but many have not. In 1966, the Cambridge historian of science, Robert Young, described the field as 'an avocation with very uneven standards' (p.18). That remark is still true today. It is marked by very uneven standards precisely because it is an 'avocation'.

The only way to remedy this situation is to go beyond the brief introductory sketch that is offered in the first year of undergraduate degrees and to provide opportunities for advanced training and research. There has been little movement in this direction because it requires a willingness on the part of psychology departments to use their limited resources to support this kind of work.

Fortunately, there are some exceptions to the rule. In 1967, the Department of Psychology at the University of New Hampshire began to offer MA and PhD degrees in history and theory of psychology. The specialization still exists and many students have graduated since that time. A postgraduate option in history and theory of psychology was also established in the Department of Psychology at York University, Toronto in 1980. The option continues to thrive and currently has a dozen students at various stages of their MA and PhD work (Fancher, 1995). Similar opportunities for advanced training and research exist in psychology departments at universities in Brazil, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Spain (Brozek, 1983, 1994). Psychology departments at British universities have been slow to follow this trend but one suspects that such opportunities will eventually exist in the United Kingdom as well[2].

Notes

[1] This situation will change in the near future (Elizabeth Valentine, personal communication, 4 July 1997).

[2] I write these words in the knowledge that attempts are currently being made to establish a centre for advanced training and research at a British university.

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Implications for research

Paul Stenner

Steven D. Brown

Paul Stenner
and
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argue for the centrality of history and philosophy in current psychological research.

THIS article argues for the centrality of historical and philosophical considerations within the broad spectrum of existing psychological research. Such a claim might appear to be out of step with the increasingly austere economic realities under which psychologists labour, or even as counter-productive to the growing requirement to delineate clearly academic and professional boundaries of expertise. On a more personal level, are we not already over-burdened simply in keeping up with the ever-diversifying *psychological* literature? Certainly one clear response to the current period of rapid expansion and bewildering change has been to tighten up (and, where possible, enforce) the existing definitions of psychological practice.

We shall argue that there are probems with this tendency towards defining psychology 'legalistically'. Our argument is not that we should retrain as philosophers and historians (these disciplines have enough troubles of their own), but that, built in to psychological research, there must be space for systematic reflection on the social and historical complexities now recognized to be immanent both to the issues we psychologists address and to the structure of the discipline itself (Danziger, 1990; Smith, 1988; Rose, 1989; Richards, 1996). Incorporating a historical and philosophical dimension to our work is not a tolerated indulgence, but a means of furthering psychology in the ongoing reconfigurations of scientific and professional boundaries. We begin by attending to the history of the discipline itself.

Science, technology, methodology

In the late 19th century, along with the growing power and prestige of machine technology and the physical sciences, two key factors created the conditions for psychology to emerge as a modern, independent science: one philosophical, the other technical/technological.

First, a growing consensus concern-ing the plausibility of evolutionary theory enabled the human mind to be thought of as a natural entity subject to natural laws, thus rendering human beings stu-diable *scientifically* as one organic life-form amongst others (Venn, 1984; Richards, 1996). The 'founding fathers' such as James, Wundt and Freud are called so precisely because they offered a new foundation for psychology's disci-plinary identity (i.e. a new ground for deciding what psychology *is* and hence what psychologists *are*). We call this factor philosophical, not just because the likes of James and Wundt were trained philosophers (and physicians), but because this 'founding moment' was the systematically applied idea of scientific empiricism (the argument that what had worked so productively for the physical sciences could be extended to the study of persons).

This foundation, then, was not any solid or empirical thing like the concrete foundations of a building. The new defi-nition was not based on *facts,* but upon a *philosophy* which commits us newly to treating matters of human mind and behaviour as a domain of empirically discoverable facts (cf. Heidegger, 1982). Positivism takes over when this philoso-phy at the heart of psychology is denied and driven out, leaving the arid miscon-ception that facts alone are what is at stake. James' famous return from 'that nasty little subject' (Robinson, 1995) to philosophy, and Wundt's dissatisfaction with US interpretations of his ideas (his resistance to breaking ties with philoso-phy and his later emphasis on *Volkerpsychologie*), testify to their resis-tance to the positivist simplifications which developed from their work.

The second factor grounding and enabling the development of psychology was a growing social need in the West for technical solutions to human-based problems. Social problems such as crime, poverty, unemployment and mental ill-ness were increasingly presented as demanding social-technological inter-vention. Developments such as the dramatic expansion of universal educa-tion and the bureaucratization of the work situation posed new problems of human regulation, organization and assessment. These problems and develop-

ments called out for *practitioners* of human behaviour (Hollway, 1984; Rose, 1989; Stainton Rogers *et al.*, 1995). Vast funding was also being made available for such a professional project (Danziger, 1990, ch.8). This applied grounding for psychology was very rarely a case of the subsequent 'application' of initially 'pure' research findings. At the risk of offending, from the offset the practitioner tail has wagged the academic dog.

These two distinct foundations for a new disciplinary identity — philosophical and technical — would have been in even greater tension were it not for the decisive influence of a third factor crucial to the establishment of psychology: methodology (Richards, 1996). Methodology operated as a hinge between the philosophical definition of psychology-as-science and the technological one of psychology-as-applied-professional-project. Philosophically, Kant had famously ruled out the possibility of a science of psychology on the grounds that psychological phenomena could not be mathematized. Inspired by the psychophysics of Weber and Fechner, Wundt and others, however modestly, proved this incorrect by developing experimental methods which rendered simple psychological processes (such as reaction times) amenable to mathematical measurement (Danziger, 1990). This philosophical condition, having been met, was quickly reduced to a technical matter (much to Wundt's dissatisfaction) when Wundtian laboratory equipment and methodological techniques were exported to the US with little concern for the ideas that informed their use (Reiber, 1980). Method*olatry* takes over when the status of science is claimed simply by virtue of using scientific methods.

Technologically, methods assumed a central role as the *means* by which desired interventions could be effected (a professional psychologist, as opposed to the lay person, has *methods*). For example, regardless of whether we believe intelligence tests *measure* anything, we can be sure that they permit a population to be translated into a knowable statistical distribution which can thenceforth be selectively administered (these to this stream/job/rank, those to that). This 'hinge' of methodology enabled a degree of flexibility in the face of criticisms: the practitioners could warrant their interventions through the scientificity of their methods (despite the fact that the pure rarely preceded the applied) and the academics could justify any paucity of genuine scientific discoveries by pointing to successful applications.

Accessories and necessities

Psychology, then, does not simply 'have' a history; it *is* a historical development.

At the heart of that historical development lies something philosophical. If these statements sound odd, then this is because psychology has systematically distanced itself from its history and its philosophy: that is, from itself. This is perhaps unsurprising given that to define itself as a discrete discipline psychology quite correctly needed to assert its independence. What could be further from the practical requirements of an applied discipline than the lofty speculations of philosophy? What further from the hi-tech progressiveness of a cutting-edge science than the dusty tomes of the historian? In its more positivistic manifestations, psychology proudly announces its active disinterest in philosophy and history. Less extreme positions encourage such interests as luxury accessories, studied (as the stereotype has it) by old men no longer fast enough to be amongst the real business — the discovery of ahistorical facts. Psychology thus becomes truly Modern in the sense that the present is considered the state of maximal enlightenment and the past as a dark place full of error and superstition. It becomes a professional risk to cite seriously work more than two or three years old.

The point here is not simply that an ahistorical and unreflective psychology is doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past or endlessly to reinvent the wheel (what? the social and ethical complexities of emotion have been discovered again!), nor just that psychological theories are always inescapably 'of their time' (informed by the contemporary scene of knowledge and structured by current metaphors (Soyland, 1994)). It is not only the discipline that is thoroughly historical, but also the problems that we address. Although most such change is subtle and slow, here are three examples involving 180 degree 'about turns':

When LaPière studied racism (then 'color prejudice') in the 1930s he found that hotel owners would happily voice racism by telephone ('no we don't admit Chinese people') but would, we are told, *act* in a non-racist (often positive) way when confronted with Chinese guests in person. In the '90s, by contrast, research is organized around the problem that people rarely *voice* their racism but often *act* on it (Van Dijk, 1992). Astute psychologists have noticed that the nature of racism *changes* (Henriques, 1984; Billig *et al.*, 1988) and that psychology — whether it contributes or combats — is implicated in these changes (Richards, 1996).

Prior to its removal as a pathology from the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* in 1973, homosexuality was routinely the object of psychometric (and other) interrogation. After this date the 'faulty character' to be identified was increasingly the *homophobe* (Kitzinger, 1987). One 'pathology' disappears as another takes its place.

In the first edition of his social psychology textbook, Brown (1965, pp.477-8) shows that Jaensch's S-type and J-type personalities match Adorno's Egalitarian and Authoritarian types respectively. However, for Jaensch — who was a Nazi — the definite, unambiguous and tough J-type/authoritarian was the ideal ('a good Nazi Party member') and the liberal ('flaccid, weak and effeminate') S-type the problem. The fact that for Adorno the valuations were the other way around illustrates simultaneously that such values are integral to this kind of work (which is inevitable given the practical and applied task of social and personal betterment built into psychology's practitioner identity), and that historical and cultural context dramatically shapes those values and transforms the object under study. In subsequent editions of the text, this example was removed.

The contemporary context

The current state of the discipline makes the situation still more intractable. A vast expansion and specialization of sub-disciplines and practitioner bases has stretched the common bond of psychology to the limit and, in the remarkable case of the split in the North American Psychological Association, broken altogether. It seems less a case of *pax Psychologia* and more that of an archipelago state of disparate specialist theory-languages held together by scraps of a half-remembered common tongue. Even the name is going in some places, reformulated as academic departments of 'Behavioral Science' or 'Brain and Cognitive Science'.

In the absence of a generally agreed title, project or social function, scientific method becomes still more important as that which holds the discipline together and as the grounds upon which psychological research should be evaluated. The durability of this hold is questionable. Lévi-Strauss (1973) once wrote of the tendency for academics to discover and promote concepts at precisely the time when the objects they explain are changing irrevocably. The distinction between pure and applied science, for example, is rapidly being eroded. External funding pressures mean that pure research is normally a spin-off or bonus derived from applied work, involving the same researchers and resources (unlike in, say, physics). Moreover the techniques brought to bear upon pure *and* applied problems, such as modelling and simulation, increasingly tend to blur the distinction between them. Both typically end up as numerically generated representations on computer displays.

Technological advances have peculiar effects upon scientific method. The more

detailed the simulation, the easier it is to forget its status as such and to begin to confuse something like an abstracted cognitive model with concrete referents in the physical world. In weakening the link to the actual phenomena, simulations additionally problematize the logic of replication, and hence the claim for scientificity itself.

There is also a tendency for inductive statistical methods, such as structural equations modelling or meta-analysis, to stand in for conceptual work proper. Thinking is crushed beneath an 'avalanche of numbers' (Hacking, 1983). Whilst statistics *per se* should not be seen as the villain of the piece, problems emerge when advanced methods merely assimilate the errors produced by the reliance on null hypothesis significance testing (Falk & Greenbaum, 1995), with its unscientific belief that rejecting 'no effect' affirms a theory (Cohen, 1994). What is more, no appeal to methods, whether inductive or not, properly explains transformation in scientific knowledge (Feyerabend, 1975). As numerous field studies show (e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Traweek, 1988), the idea of 'good' science as adhering to a program of rules gives a poor approximation of the subtleties and elisions in how research is actually conducted.

If methods have also provided the traditional grounds for the professionalization of psychological knowledge, then this too may be increasingly displaced. George Miller (1969) famously argued that we should seek to 'give psychology away'. Yet what exactly is the nature of this gift? Who wants it? It should not be assumed that 'scientific' psychology has any especial selling power in the marketplace of ideas (Thorngate & Plouffe, 1987). For Kvale (1992):

> A visit to the psychology shelves of a university bookshop evokes a feeling of boredom. One finds the standard textbooks, the collected works of Freud and Jung, a multitude of therapeutic help-yourself paperbacks and some hardcover cognitive science books. The new provoking insights … are more likely to be found in the shelves for philosophy, literature, art and anthropology (p.40).

To which we might add popular science, physics and computing. The root of this lack of popular appeal is that, stripped of its theoretical context and terminology (i.e. the rhetoric of scientific method), so much of mainstream psychological knowledge appears pleonastic or plain common-sense (for the 'stress buffering role of social support' read 'people need people'; for 'cognitively mediated coping strategies' try 'different strokes for different folks' …).

Beyond serious public appeal, the political reception of psychology has always been limited (Rose, 1989).

Consider some of the issues raised in *The Psychologist* over the past year: ADHD, recovered memories, eurocentrism, psychological profiling for gun control, disability. All warrant a rapid response inasmuch as psychologists should have something to say about best practice — and frustrations have properly arisen at the hesitancy with which this obligation is met — but it is also apparent that more measured responses require a thorough evaluation of what is actually at issue: the historical and cultural condition of children, the nature of memory, the epoch of post-colonialism, the link between masculinity, aggression and social order, the political context of a 'disabling society'. A psychology which continues to shrink from such complexities risks exclusion from contemporary policy-making.

Judgement and hesitation

It would be foolish to argue that there is something fundamentally duplicitous about the work and research that psychologists do. One may recognize that questions of, say, cognitive abilities and race are drenched in relations of power, but also that they are in essence poorly-put questions, that imply their own atrophied answers. It is the indecent rush to judgement in psychological research, without a considered analysis of what is at issue, that is problematic. A kind of hesitation needs to be placed before judgement. This has a dual aspect. First, if psychological phenomena not only have a historical context, but also possess a history of being variously represented in psychological research, then questioning needs to begin with addressing these inter-related histories, without assuming that 'present is best'. Second, that the form questioning takes already implies particular assumptions about what kinds of things exist in the world and their relation to the researcher. The baggage brought along by these prior ontological commitments certainly requires inspection (Harré, 1993).

With regard to the application of psychology, we suggest that a very different kind of hesitation is necessary. This consists to the contrary in *resisting* speculation about the 'real' or 'true' nature of things and concentrates upon analysing what effects arise when differing representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon are treated *as if* they are real (Curt, 1994). School misbehaviour represented *as if* it were the manifestation of ADHD warrants a different treatment than misbehaviour represented *as* a problem of discipline or the product of social disadvantage. Psychological technologies 'work'; that is, they label and divide samples of persons, irrespective of whether intelligence, personality, attitudes or

ADHD exist or not. What this work then does *to* and *for* its recipients should be a key issue.

Finally, with methodology, we consider that there is little to be gained from rehearsing further the merits of qualitative over quantitative approaches. What is often elided in this debate is that both approaches are ways of producing coherence between otherwise disparate entities. As is often remarked, one can correlate simply anything, so long as it can first be quantified. One may also treat anything as a text. What remains unanalysed is how things are held together by method, the often subtle and complex ways in which they become transformed and how methods serve to marshall the world around the researcher so that their judgements appear fair and correct. Again, we argue not that such judgements should not be made, but only for systematic reflection on the often invisible work which makes them possible.

The contemporary state of the discipline makes calls for increased professionalization and the tightening of a disciplinary identity understandable. Doubtless there are benefits in improving communication with end-users of psychological research, a collective focus on ethical codes and so on. The risk, as we see it, is in enforcing a legalistic model, where judgement migrates from researchers and practitioners to a central point of discretion. We have argued that in conceptual, methodological and practical terms, judgements need to be made with regard to the specificity of the local context, which can itself only be appreciated by suspending or hesitating from the act of judging for an appreciable time. One does not do science by decree. This hesitation must necessarily include a serious rethinking of our relationship not only to the human and natural sciences, the arts and humanities, but also to the practical and applied matter of our professional identities. To this end, we must concern ourselves particularly with the history and philosophy proper to our discipline, and that means precisely not a luxury appendage to the 'real business'. Now is not the time to ignore the world around us.

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Philosophy and the practice of therapy

Clare Crellin
considers the contribution of philosophy to the practice of psychotherapy.

MY aim is not to argue a case, but to illustrate the potential contribution of philosophy to psychotherapy. In particular, the contribution of philosophy of science to reflecting on the nature of psychotherapy practice; the definition of a symptom and what its status might be; the role of memory in psychotherapy; and ways of thinking about the ethical relationship with the client. The position I have taken up is, of course, a personal one. A variety of alternative positions may be equally defensible. My point is that becoming conscious of having taken up a particular position, as one must with respect to particular therapy approaches, is a philosophical process.

Philosophical questions are implicit in every therapy. Whatever the approach, the therapist is unavoidably taking up a philosophical position, often without being aware of this. The belief that science is value-free and therefore that, in applied scientific psychology, the therapist is objective, is a philosophical position. The feminist critique has shown that objectivity is not possible even in experimental research. It is suggested that the process of experimental psychological research may be structured around relations of dominance, and that the perspective of the 'subject' may have been ignored at the expense of validity (Griffin, 1995).

In psychotherapy, the problem of the therapist's subjectivity cannot be avoided by turning to cognitive or behaviour therapy. As far back as 1975, a Society working party paper spoke of the way that 'problems of resistance come unbidden into the behaviour therapist's office' and argued that psychologists are and must inevitably be psychotherapists. Whether a therapist can or cannot be objective is a matter of debate. Views may vary according to the orientation of the individual and the degree of commitment to empiricism. Being aware of the different philosophical assumptions underlying approaches to therapy enables these different positions to be articulated. This makes choosing between different therapeutic approaches more than a question of what is effective, and enables discrimi-nations to be made with respect to the basis on which the therapy rests.

One crucial problem for psychotherapy is the primacy of the scientific approach in academic psychology and its privileging of empirically derived 'knowledge'. Historically, this has led to a marginalization of other approaches to thinking. The academic disciplines of history, anthropology, literary criticism, art and philosophy — which traditionally shared with psychology membership of the 'humanities' and are by definition not sciences — evaluate theories on a basis of greater or lesser plausibility. Philosophy allows the status of psychology within systems of thinking to be examined. The scientific basis of academic psychology may then be viewed as one way of thinking about human experience, amongst other possible ways. Since philosophy is concerned with thinking about thinking, it can ask questions about psychological practice that 'psychology as science' does not raise.

Philosophers of science have recently questioned the status of science, as have critical historians and social psychologists. The question of the status of science has huge implications for approaches to psychotherapy. There is even a question as to whether psychology itself wishes to continue to be a science. Recent critiques of the scientific method have led to a search for new ways of thinking and for new methodologies. Qualitative methods, which focus on content, have been explored. A crucial question for the practice of psychotherapy is whether to focus on clients' behaviour or on their experience. If a problem is defined by its meaning for the client, the question of whether psychological therapeutic practice derives from psychology as a science of behaviour, as was once thought, or, more broadly, from psychology as the art of experience, is left open.

Symptoms

Differing views about what a symptom is give rise to different approaches to relieving the sufferer. Psychological symptoms may or may not be viewed as entities. A critical historical approach to

mental illness was adopted by Mary Boyle (1990) with respect to the concept of schizophrenia. In *Schizophrenia, a Scientific Delusion?*, she attacked the concept of schizophrenia on theoretical grounds as having no demonstrable scientific validity as a disease entity. Her work opened up a vigorous and, it has to be said, often acrimonious debate about whether schizophrenia would be treated as an organic illness with a potentially demonstrable physiological cause, or whether it would be better understood as a psychosocial problem.

Ian Hacking, in *Rewriting the Soul* (1995), critically examined the development of a 'symptom syndrome', using 'multiple personality' as a case example. He suggested that the recent rise in numbers of people presenting with this condition, rarely heard of before the 1980s, was linked both with the development of a team of experts in the US who had much to gain from promoting acceptance of the existence of something out there in the real world to which the term referred, and with the publication of 'first person accounts' of experiences of sufferers. These accounts were widely available, and may have offered to others a new way of making sense of a particular form of experience. Hacking concluded that people describe their experience of distress in ways which vary over time according to the changing assumptions and modes of expression available within the prevailing culture.

Byron J. Good (1990), in his anthropological work *Medicine, Rationality, and Experience*, demonstrated through his studies of narrative representations of illness in Turkey the ways in which illness narratives and explanations have the potential to 'recast reality'. That is, people describe their symptoms within a 'network of perspectives' provided by the 'diverse voices' of experts (e.g. doctors, religious leaders, shamans, public figures and the media) and others competing to interpret illness in society. I would suggest that not only patients but healers and therapists also construct their 'object' by making sense of 'illness' using the multiplicity of perspectives culturally available to them. During this century we have seen how perspectives alter over time. Hacking mentions as examples the rise and decline of hysteria as a symptom, and the rise in frequency of cases of anorexia, bulimia and childhood abuse as well as the decline of hypnosis and of magnetic treatments for psychological distress.

We are challenged with the task of approaching the symptom as a conceptual notion that is not empirically definable. It seems important to be able to make that distinction between the psychological symptom as empirical object 'out there' and the symptom as social construction, and to be able to accept the language used by clients to describe their distress. It follows that what is emphasized in therapy (by both client and therapist, as we are all immersed in our own culture) will depend on the prevailing cultural understanding of ourselves and how we function.

Memory

Recent debates given prominence in *The Psychologist* have highlighted the controversial issue surrounding the status of childhood memories recounted in therapy, namely, whether or not these relate to actual events. Assumptions about the status of memory vary among the different approaches to psychotherapy. There may be reasons for selecting a particular form of therapy, such as behaviour therapy, because it does not make use of remembered past events, but rather records the immediately available present. By contrast, memory is the focus of much of psychotherapy. Different presuppositions about memory may influence one's therapeutic orientation. Cognitive therapy, with its emphasis on diaries and reconstructed events, may appear to make empirical assumptions about memory, but ultimately the goal of cognitive therapy is to gain access to non-verifiable constructs, such as thoughts and beliefs.

Remembering may be thought of, as Bartlett (1932) did, as narrative reconstruction which, even in the instance of remembering, contains elements of creative elaboration and selective emphasis. If so, the therapist would need to regard the client's narrative as a text and to search for meaning in a non-verifying, interpretative and exploratory sense, inviting the client to construct and elaborate on their own meaning. The psychotherapist would then aim to foster a process of self-construction, evaluation and reconstruction, through the telling and re-telling of the life-story.

What implications are there for the therapist's traditional task of 'formulating' the problem? Formulation is highly valued in some psychoanalytic approaches, particularly within the object relations school. Here interpretations based on the therapist's theoretical formulation of the problem are offered to help the client to gain insight. Formulation is also highly valued within British clinical psychology where, in recent years, the ability to formulate problems has come to define the profession and distinguish its contribution from that of others (MPAG, 1990).

But, what could it mean to 'formulate' a problem which is being creatively reconstructed in memory, and expressed within a culture which makes varying assumptions concerning illness, symptoms, facts, cure and expert knowledge? There is a basic question: who holds 'expert knowledge', the client, who is privy to his or her own experiences, or the therapist, who has knowledge of certain theories? We might more usefully ask: how is the client formulating the problem and why is it being formulated in this way? If I, with all my own assumptions and presuppositions derived from my training, cannot, as Guy Claxton (1994) recommends, 'leapfrog upstream of my own assumptions', what is my formulation likely to be but the translation of the client's own utterances into my own frame of reference, which I then teach to the client? If this formulation replaces the client's own perspective, how does this help the client to 'possess herself'? Might this not lead to her possessing me, not in the form of my private self with all its uncertainties, but in the form of a theory which my 'expert knowledge' privileges me to formulate for her?

For me, formulation is, on the one hand, a skill I have gained something from acquiring. It encourages me to analyse and ask questions about where my hunches are coming from and to be aware of what they may be influenced by. On the other hand, for the practice of psychotherapy, it can become a dangerous exercise if I begin to believe that I am the 'knowing other'. This belief may lead me away from understanding and, at worst, could make me cruel as I may impose borrowed ideas and judgements onto another's struggle to make sense of their life and to 'talk themselves into existence', one defined by themselves rather than others. Formulation may be a useful concept, but there may be limitations and dangers when it is applied to individual experience.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time* (1995, first published 1927), describes the human being as having an inescapable obligation to be concerned with its own being and its relation to the world, not as an option or a choice, but as the direct result of its unique mode of being-in-the-world. If this is so, the goal of therapy would be that the client, through becoming aware of the totality of his or her own experience, should be able to understand something of their own unique mode of being in the world.

The ethical relationship with the other

One of the benefits of bringing philosophy into psychotherapy is its contribution to thinking about ethical dilemmas. But morality is not an adjunct to being human. It has been argued that it is central to the fact of being in any relationship. The Lithuanian philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, former teacher of Derrida, argued from the 1920s onwards that ethics is the 'first philosophy' which has

primacy over logic, reason and those other branches of philosophy which derive from language (see Levinas, 1994). This is because we are in relationships before we acquire language, language having evolved within the context of the demands of the social. Language is therefore secondary to relating, and is the result of relating to others. Using a poetic style (words as openings rather than closed and circumscribing, as in definitions), which in Levinas's case is derived from ancient Talmudic literature, he speaks of the 'epiphany of the face' of the other, as when someone turns their face, their gaze towards you, which calls upon us in a way which we are powerless to ignore. What is relevant to the practice of psychotherapy is that, from this point of view, the ethical relationship with the other would be the main consideration in choosing between different approaches to psychotherapy.

In *Totality and Infinity* (1979), Levinas explores the idea that, in our efforts to understand things, we run the risk of 'totalizing', that is reducing everything to the 'graspable' and circumscribable — of trying to encapsulate what cannot be encapsulated and thereby reducing it to something which can. Levinas emphasises our incapacity to stand before the infinite accepting that which we cannot understand but only 'come to know'. Levinas's position, by implication, brings into question the primacy of theory in psychotherapy. The notion of the therapist as 'knower' becomes untenable. Within this scheme, attempts to formulate a client's problems according to a theory must 'totalize' and reduce the client, as they make the other (infinite and immeasurable) into an object, thereby losing the otherness, and losing sight of a person's experience and/or our experience of them.

There is a dilemma in practising psychotherapy if, on the one hand, we objectify whilst also wishing to treat others as human and not as objects. In a phenomenological approach it would not be possible to view the client as the 'subject' of an experiment which the psychologist observes and manipulates. This would be a logical impossibility. There is no doubt that theory has a place in psychotherapy. We do need a framework with which to think, but it may be that the relationship with the other should take priority.

There are several 'schools' which seek to set boundaries for the power of theory. Lacan (1993), for instance, asserts that therapy is successful only when the client (and presumably the therapist) no longer sees the therapist as 'knower' in the therapeutic encounter. Jung had similar ideas. In existential therapy, the therapist is required to suspend theoretical assumptions and to learn to listen to what the client is actually saying. Counselling and counselling psychology, which defines itself as humanistic, focuses on wellness and a developmental life-span perspective. The client is not seen as having a problem; rather, symptoms are seen as potentially healthy responses to crises, whose meaning may not be immediately clear to either client or therapist. Here neither client nor therapist is in a 'knowing' position, and both are equal. It is worth noting that counselling psychologists are psychologists, rooted in psychological theory, but their philosophical and ethical positions lead them to very different conclusions from many clinical psychologists (for whom the therapist's formulation often takes priority) concerning the centrality of a knowledge base in the therapeutic encounter.

There are many different possible positions. A philosophical perspective can help us to define and articulate them. We may then be more conscious of the position we ourselves have taken up. Levinas writes, as also have Heidegger and Jung in their own way, of the value of understanding in the conceptual sense of 'dwelling with', 'seeing', 'being open to', 'thinking of'. Levinas spent his life thinking about the call of the other, and the psychological murder that is committed if the call is denied. I don't want to say that not being thoughtful or philosophical about what we do in therapy may lead to murder, but it may lead to the death of something.

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The case of psychology and 'race'

Graham Richards *shows how a detailed study of the history of racism deepens our understanding of the nature of psychology.*

PSYCHOLOGISTS combating racism often include some history in their texts (e.g. Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; Mama, 1995). Their message is usually that Psychology has always been ethnocentric, deeply tainted by racism, served colonialism and generally failed to grasp the nettle. (I am adopting my usual practice of using 'Psychological' to refer to the discipline and 'psychological' to refer to its subject matter (see Richards, 1996, p.1).) This remains largely true even of the more extended studies of Barkan (1992), Billig (1981), Gould (1984, 1992) and Tucker (1994). Having just completed a full-length study of the history of Psychology's dealings with 'race' and 'racism' (Richards, 1997), I must report that the picture is considerably more complex — and more interesting — than this simple picture suggests. While not in any sense seeking to mitigate Psychology's past (or present) errors, I will argue that in-depth historical research provides more fruitful insights into the natures of both the discipline and racism than simple 'spot the racism' rhetoric can do.

The first thing to strike me on embarking on the project was how far present concerns have determined the received historical picture, which always concentrates on the 1917-devised Army Alpha tests and the 1920s eugenics-inspired panic over Eastern and Southern European immigration into the US. Intelligence testing of African Americans and eugenics appeared to be the whole story. The post-Jensen 'race & IQ' controversy and the shadow of Nazi eugenics having framed the immediate issue for us, this focus is understandable in texts primarily concerned with the current situation. I was, however, surprised to discover that the two most prolific interwar US 'race psychologists', Thomas Russell Garth and S.D. Porteus (of Maze Test fame) were barely ever mentioned.

I undertook a systematic literature review of the 1909-40 period, classifying texts by genre (most importantly: pro-

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	*N*
1909/1910	8							1	9
	89							**11**	
1911/1912	4	3						2	9
	44	**33**						**22**	
1913/1914	16	2						2	20
	80	**10**						**10**	
1915/1916	16	2			2			3	23
	70	**9**			**9**			**13**	
1917/1918	19			2	1			4	26
	73			**8**	**4**			**15**	
1919/1920	19	1					1	3	24
	79	**4**					**4**	**12.5**	
1921/1922	35	1						2	38
	92	**3**						**5**	
1923/1924	26	13	1		1			5	46
	57	**29**	**2**		**2**			**11**	
1925/1926	53	12	6	3	3		2	5	84
	63	**14**	**7**	**4**	**4**		**2**	**6**	
1927/1928	33	21	13	13	2		1	10	93
	35	**22.5**	**14**	**14**	**2**		**1**	**11**	
1929/1930	23	14	10	11	2	3	2	8	73
	31.5	**19**	**14**	**15**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**11**	
1931/1932	22	22	14	36	5	4	1	11	115
	19	**19**	**12**	**31**	**4**	**3**	**1**	**10**	
1933/1934	22	21	16	29	8	4		10	110
	20	**19**	**14.5**	**26**	**7**	**4**		**9**	
1935/1936	10	22	20	35	4	5		9	105
	9.5	**21**	**19**	**33**	**4**	**5**		**9**	
1937/1938	14	20	20	35	21	3	1	17	130
	11	**15**	**15**	**21**	**16**	**2**	**0.8**	**13**	
1939/1940	11	22	28	51	39	2	1	11	165
	6.5	**13.3**	**17**	**31**	**23.6**	**1.2**	**0.6**	**6.6**	
Total	331	176	128	215	88	21	9	103	1071
	30.9	**16.4**	**12**	**20**	**8.2**	**2.0**	**0.8**	**9.6**	

A – Race psychology.
B – Anti-race psychology.
C – Prejudice/attitudes.
D – Applied/intra-racial.
E – Culture & personality.
F – Genetics of colour blindness etc.
G – Non-white autobiographies etc.
H – Other: mostly sociological or historical receiving citations in Psychological literature and *Psychological Abstracts*.
This does not include physical anthropology/genetics except where bearing on psychological issues.
The post-1930 decline in US Category A publications is somewhat steeper than these figures suggest since a higher proportion from this period were non-US authored.
Bold figures: per cent.

Table 1: Summary of English language publication data 1909-1940

race differences, anti-race differences, prejudice studies, applied and intra-racial, and 'culture and personality'). With more than 1,000 titles I was able to track their frequency, showing the pro-differences genre collapsing in the early 1930s from about 56 per cent of items up to 1930 to under 13 per cent from 1931 onwards (Table 1).

The omissions of Garth and Porteus also fell into place. Garth rarely studied African Americans, was a Woodworthian functionalist rather than eugenicist and by 1931 had completely changed his mind, opposing racialist doctrines thereafter (compare e.g. Garth, 1925 and Garth, 1934). Porteus also ignored African Americans (concentrating on Hawaiian ethnic groups and Australian aborigines) and rejected IQ tests as useless for predicting 'social efficiency', preferring a test of his own devising (Porteus & Babcock, 1926; Porteus, 1930, 1931). Unlike Garth, Porteus remained a scientific racist all his life, though his autobiography (Porteus, 1969) seriously fudges this.

J. Peterson, the acknowledged leading expert on 'Negro intelligence' of the time, was also never cited. Although a believer in race differences until his death in 1935 he too was no eugenicist, and his research raised and addressed numerous methodological difficulties which seriously moderated the conviction with which his findings of race differences were stated (e.g. Peterson 1927, 1934).

Viewing the overall picture, I realized that the inter-war role of US Psychology with regard to 'race' had a curious reflexive aspect. Taken jointly, 'Race Psychology', the criticisms mounted against it, attempts to take these into account and the rise of alternative 'paradigms' amounted to a collective psychological process in its own right, one whereby 'racism' was in some sense discovered or constituted as a phenomenon and target for Psychological research (though 'race prejudice' remained the usual term). Their genuine failure to discover differences which could be more plausibly explained on the grounds of race enabled psychologists to address the belief, now rendered irrational, that they existed. 'Prejudice' ceased to be simply a moral pejorative term and became a genuine psychological phenomenon. US Psychology could thus be seen as an arena in which cultural psychological concerns and conflicts were played out.

Turning to Britain, I knew that Karl Pearson had published a notorious piece of research on Jewish children in *Annals of Eugenics,* claiming that they were markedly inferior in intellectual performance, and that this was routinely cited as demonstrating the racist nature of British eugenics (Pearson & Moul, 1925-8). Francis Galton and Herbert Spencer

had been in the forefront of scientific racist theorising in the 19th century, and the work by W.H.R. Rivers, C.S.Myers and W. McDougall on the 1898 Cambridge Torres Straits Expedition (Haddon, 1901, 1903) had marked the beginning of professional experimental studies of race differences.

Surely a rich seam of relevant British Psychology was waiting to be uncovered. I then found, on scouring the two main British eugenics journals — *Eugenics Review* and *Annals of Eugenics* — that race was very low on their agendas (Pearson & Moul's being the only paper on the topic ever to appear in the *Annals* up to 1940!). Coverage in *Eugenics Review*, again scanty, was mainly concerned with effects of 'race-crossing', such as inter-marriage and racial mixing, but it included papers from both directions on this. It explicitly denounced anti-semitism (*Eugenics Review*, 1920) and published a study refuting Pearson's conclusions (Hughes, 1928). Elsewhere, F.C. Bartlett (1923) and Rivers had no time for 'race' questions and rejected the 'primitive mentality' notion popular in mainland Europe. Even C. Spearman and C. Burt turned out to attach little importance to the IQ differences reported in the US, although tending to accept that they existed (e.g. Burt, 1935). The only really racist, virtually pro-Nazi, major British psychologist was R.B. Cattell (see especially Cattell, 1933, 1938)[1]. (McDougall, another strong Nordicist, really belongs in the US scene between the wars.)

The *British Journal of Psychology, British Journal of Educational Psychology* and *British Journal of Medical Psychology* did publish occasional race-related papers, but of too heterogeneous a nature to constitute a research tradition. The few papers comparing Jewish and Gentile performance were all aimed at combating anti-semitism (e.g. J. Rumyaneck, 1931). Others, often by anthropologists such as C.G. Seligman and S.F. Nadel, were more akin to the emerging US 'culture and personality' school in approach.

In short, inter-war British (unlike US) eugenics was not very interested in psychological race differences and British psychologists largely ignored the topic. Again a reflexive dimension became apparent. It was not only that race was not a serious domestic issue (although this had not stopped Galton and Spencer); post-1918 Britain was in a very different situation than hitherto. Independence movements were stirring across the Empire, supported by ideological attacks from the domestic left. The response was to promote the Empire as a rainbow alliance of peoples, inculcating a kind of Imperial patriotism. 'Race prejudice' was a foreign vice, exhibited by Americans with their 'colour bar' and Germans with their anti-semitism.

Britons were immune.

It is in this period, I would suggest, that the basis was laid for that peculiar and chronic British (especially middle-class) inability to admit to its racism. In the absence of a well articulated racist tradition, the post-World War Two British have constantly explained their racism away as something else — such as a figment of over-sensitive immigrant imagination — to the perennial mystification of those who have been its targets. Again then, we can see Psychology mirroring the psychological state of the culture at large.

My message then is that in-depth historical study of this topic deepens our insights in a way relevant to the present. It renders visible how racism assumes different forms in different circumstances, makes us more aware of the way our work as psychologists functions within the psychological dynamics of our society, and gives us a sense of the nature and pace of Psychological and psychological change over time. In this it reinforces the positions of those such as Goldberg (1993) and Cohen (1992) who reject essentialist notions of racism as being a unitary, discrete, psychological phenomenon. Far from weakening the anti-racist case I believe this strengthens it by abandoning easy rhetoric (always a hostage to fortune) and building a more solid account. It enables us to see more clearly the long-term processes in which we are engaged. (Additionally it might help us save time — the notoriously ritual character of the race-differences debate whenever it resurfaces might be cut short if we refused to respond to the pro-differences camp until they have actually answered the case against them made by Otto Klineberg in 1935!)

One final point is the danger of anachronistic condemnation (which is not to say that past writers cannot be judged; far from it — I have done plenty of this in my forthcoming book). The anti-racist struggle has been very much like peeling the proverbial onion. Each generation can only go so far before it is stymied by its own psychological limitations. The post-war US liberal social psychologists who strove to combat 'race prejudice', such as G.W. Allport, now often read as naive and ethnocentric; e.g. Allport (1954) at one point inadvertently uses the phrase 'people who live in close contact with Negroes' (p.217) as if 'Negroes' were not people! They have difficulty in including non-European groups in their readership audience (as this quote indicates). They were as yet unable to entertain the idea of combating racialized discourse as such. That other ethnic groups need to develop their own Psychologies, rather than learn to apply the 'objectively scientific' white one was never suggested. But the 'prejudice' study phase was nevertheless a neces-

sary step in the process of rendering such issues visible. Such writers cannot be lumped together with those psychologists like R.B. Cattell and H.E. Garrett who vehemently defended the legitimacy of race prejudice and segregation (Tucker, 1994).

My reflexive approach here applies equally to other areas of Psychology, although each has its distinctive and challenging features. There is no easy algorithm for unravelling the past. From this perspective the history of Psychology ceases to be a mere antiquarian exercise; it becomes an essential part of the task of understanding that Protean phenomenon, 'psychology' — the ever changing subject matter of our discipline.

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Notes

[1] The fierceness of this statement requires justification. I refer the reader to the extensive discussion of Cattell in W.H. Tucker (1994), especially pp.239-251, for a damning exposé of Cattell's position in the 1930s and indeed subsequently.

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The pictures of Myers (p.180) and Cattell (p.181) are from the Grace Rawlings Visual Archive.